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HEIGHTENED SECURITY:
THE NEED TO INCORPORATE ARTICLES 3BIS(1)(A)
AND 8BIS(5)(E) OF THE 2005 DRAFT SUA PROTOCOL
INTO PART VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
Caitlin A. Harrington†
Abstract: Maritime terrorism on the Pacific Ocean is a growing threat. Terrorists
can take advantage of widening gaps in the world’s maritime security regime. The
current incarnation of the legal framework surrounding the nonflag-state right of visit has
exacerbated emerging weaknesses. The world must be willing to allow nonflag states
greater power to board vessels on the high seas that are suspected of participating in
maritime terrorism.
The ship-boarding procedures within the 2005 Draft Protocol to the 1988
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation are a step in the right direction. They do not go far enough, however, toward
increasing maritime security.
To effectively combat maritime terrorism, the international community should
amend the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, incorporating Article
3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) of the 2005 Draft Protocol into Part VII of the
Convention. This would create an additional exception to the principle of exclusive flagstate jurisdiction and control on the high seas, allowing for a nonflag-state right of visit
given reasonable grounds to suspect that a ship has committed, is committing, or is about
to commit an act of maritime terrorism as defined by Article 3bis(1)(a).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Widening gaps in maritime security have resulted in weaknesses ripe
for exploitation by terrorist organizations targeting the waters of the Pacific
Ocean. The danger of maritime terrorism has become increasingly clear. A
member of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization, a group with ties to
Al Qa’ida, has admitted to the Indonesia National Intelligence Agency that
the waters of Southeast Asia have emerged as a potential target.1 In a
separate incident, Barbar Ahmad, another terrorist linked to Al Qa’ida, was
discovered with a set of plans outlining the vulnerabilities of American naval
fleets, raising fears of a maritime terrorist attack.2
†
The author would like to thank Ximena Heinrich, legal officer at the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea, for encouraging her interest in this topic during her legal internship at the tribunal,
Professor Kristin Stilt for serving as her University of Washington School of Law advisor, her editors at the
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their work, and her friends and family for their support and
inspiration. Any errors or omissions are the author’s own.
1
Joshua Ho, The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia, MIL. TECH., May 1, 2005, at 14, 15.
2
Id.
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International terrorist organizations have strengthened their maritime
presence. Recent estimates are that Osama bin Laden and those associated
with him control a dozen to fifty freighters.3 Al-Qa’ida, the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaff Group, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Kumpulan
Militan Malaysia, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, and Laskar Jihad are all
suspected of planning or undertaking maritime attacks in the Asia Pacific
region.4 Reports also indicate a growing interest on the part of Al-Qa’ida,
Jemaah Islamiyah and the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia to launch terrorist
attacks targeting global trade and the U.S. Navy.5
Although many of the potential targets of maritime terrorism lie in the
coastal waters and ports of nation states, effective control over the high seas
remains a vital element in the prevention of attacks. Pursuant to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), the vast majority
of the world’s oceans are classified as the high seas. Therefore, it is likely
that terrorist vessels, even those whose eventual targets lie closer to the
shoreline, will travel through the high seas.
Terrorists, taking advantage of weak international enforcement, can
also directly target ships traveling on the high seas. In the words of U.S.
Admiral Walter F. Doran, “terrorism, like water, flows through the paths of
least resistance.”6 This comment argues that, under the current international
legal framework, the international community has very little power to resist
a terror attack on the high seas.
Weak flag-state7 control over vessels traveling on the high seas creates
gaps in maritime security, exacerbating the threat of maritime terrorism.
UNCLOS codifies the exclusive right of flag states to exercise jurisdiction
and control over their vessels traveling on the high seas. While UNCLOS
provides a limited number of exceptions allowing for a nonflag-state right of
visit given specific circumstances, none of the exceptions focuses on the
prevention of a maritime terrorist attack.
Under current international law of the sea, nonflag states must gain
flag-state permission to board a suspect vessel on the high seas or rely upon
the flag state to ensure that the vessel is not involved in terrorist activity.
Flag states exert varying levels of regulation and enforcement over their
3
Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the
Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 131, 145 (2005).
4
U.S. Urges Nations to Sign Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Terrorism, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 12,
2005.
5
Id.
6
Admiral Walter F. Doran, 18th Asialink Lecture Address, Sept. 9, 2003, available at
http://www.cpf.navy.mil/speeches/030909.htm.
7
For a description of flag states, see infra comment II(B)(1).
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ships. So-called “flags of convenience” are those of flag states that fail to
strictly monitor and enforce international law on their vessels. To prevent a
maritime terrorist attack, the international community clearly must rectify
the weaknesses in maritime security created by inadequate flag-state
enforcement.
The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA Convention”) and the 2005 Draft
Protocol to the SUA Convention (“2005 Draft Protocol”) are both attempts
to strengthen international maritime security. The director for operations
policy of the United States Coast Guard, Rear Admiral Wayne Justice,
describes the 2005 Draft Protocol as providing “unprecedented tools” that
will counteract the threat of maritime terrorism if and when it enters into
force.8
This comment focuses on Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) of
the 2005 Draft Protocol (“Article 3bis(1)(a)” and “Article 8bis(5)(e)”). It
argues that while the ship-boarding provisions of the 2005 Draft Protocol
increase international maritime security, they do not create a strong-enough
defense against maritime terrorism. The international community should
amend UNCLOS Part VII, incorporating the definition of maritime terrorism
contained within Article 3bis(1)(a) and the ship-boarding procedure of
Article 8bis(5)(e) into the Convention. This would create a nonflag-state
right of visit on the high seas given reasonable suspicion of a ship’s
involvement in terrorist activity.
Part II of this comment outlines the increasing danger posed by
maritime terrorism on the Pacific Ocean and the failure of the ship-boarding
procedures codified in UNCLOS to adequately respond to this threat. Part
III discusses how the 2005 Draft Protocol, through Article 3bis and Article
8bis, attempts to prevent maritime terrorism. Part IV analyzes Article
3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e), finding that they endeavor to strengthen
maritime security while working within established international law,
including the current UNCLOS framework. Part V argues that the
international community should amend Part VII of UNCLOS, incorporating
Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into the convention. This would
create a nonflag-state right of visit on the high seas given reasonable
grounds to suspect that a vessel has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an act of maritime terrorism as defined by Article 3bis(1)(a).

8
U.S. Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT) Holds A Joint Subcommittee Hearing On
International Maritime Security, CAP. TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 13, 2005.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW GUIDELINES ON THE NONFLAG STATE RIGHT OF
VISIT ON THE HIGH SEAS ARE TOO LIMITED TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT
AGAINST THE GROWING FORCE OF MARITIME TERRORISM

The threat of maritime terrorism is a grave concern. Weaknesses in
international security created by limitations on high-seas ship boarding have
exacerbated the problem. The international community should incorporate
Article 8bis(5)(e) and Article 3bis(1)(a) into UNCLOS Part VII, creating a
nonflag-state right of visit on the high seas given reasonable grounds to
suspect a ship’s involvement in terrorism.
This comment recognizes that it is likely that future terrorist attacks
will occur within the ports and the territorial waters of states. It focuses,
however, on the ability of the international community to board vessels on
the high seas before they reach their targets.
A.

Maritime Terrorism on the Pacific Ocean Is an Increasing Threat to
International Peace and Security

The international community has become increasingly concerned with
maritime terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
against the United States.9 International specialists fear that terrorists will
“exploit[]” the ocean to “simultaneously facilitate terrorist logistical and
operational designs.”10
The importance of effective security on the world’s oceans has
become especially imperative “for the United States and Canada, member
states of the European Union, Australia and New Zealand, and for China,
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and other economies in
East Asia that have extensive direct seaborne trade with the U.S., Europe,
and other industrialized nations.”11
In contrast to current concerns, maritime terrorism has not posed a
large historical threat to international security. The RAND Terrorism
Chronology Database and the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident state that
“seaborne strikes . . . constituted only 2 percent of all international incidents
9

Michael Richardson, Drugs and Terrorism Roams [sic] the High Seas Under Tuvaluan Flag, THE
STRAIGHT TIMES, May 22, 2003, available at http://www.tuvaluislands.com/news/archived/2003/2003-0521.htm.
10
Peter Chalk, Maritime Terrorism in the Contemporary Era: Threat and Potential Future
Contingencies, in THE MIPT TERRORISM ANNUAL 2006, 19, 20 (2006) available at
http://www.tkb.org/documents/Downloads/2006-MIPT-Terrorism-Annual.pdf.
11
Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Institute of South East Asian Studies Viewpoints, 2 (Feb. 25, 2004)
available at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/mricsumfeb04.pdf.
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of the last thirty years.”12 The past lack of maritime terrorism may be
explained by a simple cost-benefit analysis: “in a world of finite human and
material assets, the costs and unpredictability associated with expanding to
the maritime realm have typically trumped any potential benefits.”13
Unfortunately, the appeal of maritime terrorism has increased for
several reasons. First, due the increased strength of international media, “it
is now far more probable that attacks at sea will elicit the necessary exposure
and publicity that terrorists crave.”14 Second, it has become easier for
potential terrorists to “gain basic skills and equipment for seaborne
attacks.”15 Third, even if terrorists are unable to obtain the skills themselves,
they may “be able to overcome existing shortcomings in seaborne attack
capabilities by contracting out to pirate syndicates.”16 Finally, it has become
increasing clear that global shipping is vulnerable “as a result of the largely
unpoliced nature of the high seas,” the lack of enough “serious programs of
coastal surveillance, and the sheer esoteric character that typifies much of
the oceanic environment.”17
The list of terrorist organizations that have “moved to conspicuously
integrate waterborne modalities into their overall logistical and attack
mandates” is extensive.18 It includes the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the
Lebanese Hezbollah, Abu Sayyaf Group, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Jamaat al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad, and Al
Qa’ida.19 Intelligence agencies of the United States and Norway have
identified numerous freighters flagged under the registries of “Yemen,
Somalia, and the Pacific Island of Tonga” that they believe to be “owned or
controlled by the Al [Qa’ida] network.”20
A maritime terrorist attack in the Pacific Ocean could take on a
number of manifestations in addition to a traditional attack against a ship
traveling through the region’s waters. As ports have become “critical nodes
of global seaborne trade,” they have emerged as tempting terrorist targets.21
For example, terrorists could work with the region’s pirates, hijacking
12

Chalk, supra note 10 at 21.
Id.
14
Id., at 23.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id., at 22.
18
Id., at 29-30.
19
Id.
20
Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO, ENERGY SECURITY (prepared by the Institute
for the Analysis of Global Security), Jan. 24, 2005, available at http://www.iags.org/n0124051.htm
[hereinafter ENERGY SECURITY].
21
Ho, supra note 1, at 15.
13
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liquefied natural gas carriers and transforming them into “floating bombs to
disable ports.”22 Terrorists also could attack vital ports with “dirty bombs”
smuggled in shipping containers.23
In addition to transiting through the high seas on their way to or from
launching an attack closer to shore, a terrorist organization could target a
vessel traveling on the high seas. International fear of such an attack
increased in October 2002 with the detainment of Abd al Rahman al Nashiri,
the man who many “believe[] to have been responsible for the attack on the
USS Cole.”24 Along with learning that Al Qaeda had begun “preparations to
attack ships in the Mediterranean,” the international community also
uncovered “a dossier captured with Nashiri” naming “cruise liners sailing
from Western ports [as] ‘targets of opportunity.’”25
Recent attacks in Southeast Asia illustrate the danger inherent in the
failure to prevent a maritime terrorist attack. Since 2000, a number of
maritime terrorist attacks have shocked the region. In February 2000, forty
people were killed and fifty wounded when the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front bombed the Our Lady Mediatrix, a Philippine ferry.26 Less than two
years later, in December 2001, an Indonesian ferry, the Kalifornia, was
bombed while sailing through the country’s Maluku Archipelago, killing ten
individuals and injuring forty-six more.27 The attack on the Kalifornia was
not a solitary act of violence but rather the beginning of “a cycle of
violence” resulting in attacks on several other vessels.28 Unrelated to the
Kalifornia tragedy, another one hundred and sixteen people died in the
February 2004 sinking of the Super Ferry close to Manila, an attack for
which the terrorist organization Abu Sayyaff has taken responsibility.29
Finally, although not an act of maritime terrorism, the triple nightclub
bombing that shook Bali on October 12, 2002, is symbolic of the strength of
terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia.30
Terrorists target vessels not only for attack. The So San incident
awoke the world to the ease with which vessels could be used to transport
weapons of mass destruction and other terrorist materials. This comment
does not address the transportation of weapons of mass destruction. The So
22

Id.
Id.
24
ENERGY SECURITY, supra note 20.
25
Id.
26
John F. Bradford, The Growing Prospects For Maritime Security Cooperation In Southeast Asia,
58 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 63, 67 (2005).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id., at 71.
30
Id., at 67.
23
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San incident, however, demonstrates that weapons used to carry out
maritime terrorist attacks can be hidden within seemingly legitimate cargo.
In December 2002, the Spanish Navy, acting on information provided
by the United States, boarded the So San.31 Though the vessel was
registered in Cambodia, the nonflag-state boarding was allowed under
UNCLOS Article 110 because the ship flew no flag and had concealed its
name with paint.32 The So San had originated in North Korea33 and at the
time it was interdicted was on the high seas six hundred miles off the
Yemeni coast.34 The Spanish Navy uncovered fifteen SCUD missiles buried
beneath the So San’s declared cargo of cement.35 Although the So San was
eventually allowed to continue onto its destination, following a declaration
by Yemen that it had bought the weapons from North Korea, it illustrated the
ease with which terrorists could move weapons of mass destruction through
the high seas.36
B.

Existing International Ocean Law Has Not Adequately Responded to
Threats Posed by Maritime Terrorism

International law, specifically the UNCLOS codification of the flagstate right of jurisdiction and control on the high seas, has proven inadequate
to meet the threat of terrorism. There is no uniformity in the level and
quality of regulations imposed by different flag states. Flag states with poor
enforcement mechanisms create weaknesses in international security that
may be exploited by maritime terrorists. UNCLOS provides a very limited
number of circumstances under which a nonflag state may board a vessel
traveling on the high seas, none of which apply to the prevention of
maritime terrorism.

31
Thomas D. Lehrman, Enhancing the Proliferation Security Initiative: The Case for a
Decentralized Nonproliferation Architecture, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 223, 224 (2004).
32
Becker, supra note 3 at 152-53.
33
Id.
34
Lehrman, supra note 31 at 224.
35
Becker, supra note 3 at 153.
36
Lehrman, supra note 31 at 224.
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The UNCLOS Codification of Flag-State Power Leaves Too Much
Discretion and Authority to Flag States to Register Ships and to
Enforce International Law on those Vessels

Every nation has the inherent right “to sail ships flying its flag on the
high seas.”37
Ships experience varying levels of enforcement of
international law depending on the state whose flag they fly.
Notwithstanding exceptional circumstances, a vessel may fly the flag of only
one state throughout the course of its journey.38
Nations develop their own criteria for flagging ships. Pursuant to
UNCLOS Article 91, every flag state has the responsibility to “fix the
conditions for the grant of its nationality.”39 UNCLOS Article 91 places a
single requirement on the flagging of vessels, stating that “[t]here must be a
genuine link between the State and the ship.”40 UNCLOS never precisely
defines the concept of a “genuine link,” a definition that differs widely
among nations. Historically, traditional flag states, applying strict rules,
registered only those vessels owned by their own nationals.41
Today, flag-state ship registries range from open registries to closed
registries. These two types of registration systems roughly define the
spectrum of ways in which the concept of a “genuine link” has been
interpreted. Closed-registry nations register vessels based upon a set of
“strict criteria.”42 Open registry states are remarkably different. They often
impose lax restrictions and regulations, prompting criticism that effectively
they “rent out their flags” to ship owners willing to pay to register their
vessels.43 Open registries also may offer discounts on volume, an absence of
manning requirements, fewer strict shipping regulations, and decreased
taxes.44
While there are economic benefits for ship owners who register with
an open registry, the flag state also gains income through the operation of
such a registry.45 A 2003 report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development describes the impact that open registries have
had upon the definition of a “genuine link,” stating, “the linkage requirement
37
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 90, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
38
Id., art. 92.
39
Id., art. 91.
40
Id.
41
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION, STEERING THE RIGHT COURSE 11 (2003).
42
Becker, supra note 3 at 142.
43
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION, supra note 41 at 11.
44
Julie A. Perkins, Ship Registers: An International Update, 22 TUL. MAR. L.J. 197, 197 (1997).
45
Id.
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has been widely accepted as being met by nothing more than a commercial,
fee-for-service relationship between the owner and the Flag State.”46 The
term “flags of convenience” is used within the context of open registries; a
flag of convenience implies “registration for primarily economic reasons in a
country with an open registry.”47
The identity of a vessel’s flag state directly affects the level of
regulation and enforcement that it will encounter while on the high seas.
Flag states, those with both open registries and closed registries, generally
exercise “exclusive” jurisdiction over their vessels sailing on the high seas.48
They relinquish this control only in rare occasions, such as involving the
right of visit and hot pursuit, expressly stated in UNCLOS or in international
treaties.49
While a flag state may utilize its own interpretation of a “genuine
link,” it must also comply with a set of duties imposed by UNCLOS. The
responsibilities of a flag state require it to exercise its jurisdiction in an
effective manner, controlling all “administrative, technical and social matters
over ships flying its flag.”50 Additionally, UNCLOS Article 94 codifies the
requirement that a flag state act in conformity with “generally accepted
international regulations, procedures and practices,” taking all necessary
steps “to secure their observance.”51
It is well established that terrorism endangers international peace and
security52 and is counter to established international law. Therefore, a flag
state may not allow its ships to engage in terrorist violence in a manner that
would violate international regulations, procedures, and practices. While a
state will, theoretically, bear international responsibility if it breaches this
duty, there are no external enforcement mechanism to ensure flag-state
compliance.

46
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION, supra note 41, at 16 (quoting Organization
of Economic Co-Operation and Development, The Ownership and Control of Ships (March 2003)).
47
H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics,
and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 157 (1996).
48
UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 92.
49
Id., art. 110; id., art. 111.
50
Id., art. 94.
51
Id.
52
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th Meeting, Supp., at 1, S/RESS/1373 (2001) [hereinafter S.C.
Res. 1373].
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UNCLOS Does Not Grant Nonflag States a Right of Visit on the High
Seas When a Vessel Is Suspected of Terrorist Activity

As a general rule, flag states have exclusive jurisdiction over their
vessels sailing on the high seas. There are limited circumstances under
which a nonflag state may exercise a right of visit. UNCLOS Article 110
codifies these limitations: a nonflag state may board a vessel traveling on the
high seas given reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is involved in
piracy, engaged in the slave trade, broadcasting without authority, or sailing
without a flag.53
UNCLOS Article 110 is as significant for what it leaves out as for
what it includes. It does not allow a nonflag state to board a vessel on the
high seas based upon a reasonable suspicion that it has engaged in, is
engaging in, or is about to engage in terrorist activity.
UNCLOS Article 110 does include a broad exception analogous to
that contained within UNCLOS Article 92. It allows nonflag states to board
a vessel in instances “where acts of interference derive from powers
conferred by treaty.”54 Because neither UNCLOS Article 92 nor UNCLOS
Article 110 allow for a nonflag state to board a vessel based upon a
reasonable suspicion of its participation in maritime terrorism, states must,
currently, create separate treaties that allow for boarding under such a
circumstance.
C.

The Proliferation of Flags of Convenience Combined with the Extreme
Limitations on the Nonflag-State Right of Visit on the High Seas Has
Created a Situation Ripe for Maritime Terrorism

The existence of flags of convenience assumes a more ominous tone
when considered in conjunction with rising levels of maritime terrorism.
Though open registries may once have been perceived as a way to allow ship
owners to avoid burdensome regulations, they have “now taken on a
frightening new persona.”55 As was recognized in a 1981 United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development report, strict enforcement is not
compatible with the goals of registries whose sole purpose is to make a
profit.56

53

UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 110.
Id.
55
Maria J. Wing, Rethinking the Easy Way Out: Flags of Convenience in the Post-September 11th
Era, 28 TUL. MAR. L.J. 173, 173 (2003).
56
Anderson, supra note 47 at 165.
54
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Options under UNCLOS to exercise a nonflag-state high-seas right of
visit based upon a reasonable suspicion of a ship’s participation in maritime
terrorism range from limited to nonexistent. This creates a widening gap in
maritime security. Terrorist organizations may register their ships with a
flag state that has a history of weak enforcement. If the established
enforcement pattern continues, and the flag state once again fails to inspect
ships or to ensure compliance with international law, the terrorists are
subject to no enforcement of international law.
In a March 2004 resolution, the United Nations General Assembly
recognized the danger posed by weak flag-state enforcement.57 The
resolution focused on states that lack the necessary maritime administration
and legal framework to ensure international compliance with the
enforcement responsibilities designated to them by international law.58 The
General Assembly urged such states, until they strengthen their enforcement
mechanisms, “to consider declining the granting of the right to fly their flag
to new vessels, suspending their registry or not opening a registry.”59 In
addition, the General Assembly has invited the International Maritime
Organization to examine the relationship between the requirement for a
“genuine link” and the responsibility of flag states to control the vessels
flying their flags.60
III.

THE 2005 DRAFT PROTOCOL IS AN ATTEMPT TO MEET EVOLVING
MARITIME SECURITY CONCERNS

The international community created the 2005 Draft Protocol to
address weaknesses in maritime security resulting from poor flag-state
enforcement and from limitations on the nonflag-state right of visit on the
high seas. Article 3bis and Article 8bis of the 2005 Draft Protocol attempt to
strengthen maritime security while working within the existing UNCLOS
framework. To adequately protect against maritime terrorism, however, the
international community must be willing to amend UNCLOS to allow for a
nonflag-state right of visit on the high seas given reasonable grounds to
suspect that a vessel has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
act of maritime terrorism.
57
G.A. Res. 240, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., para. 27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/240 (2004) [hereinafter
G.A. Res. 58/240].
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
United Nations, Advance, Unedited Reporting Material on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 27
(Feb. 27, 2004) available at http://www.iucn.org/places/medoffice/CDGovernance/conten/2-tallerexpertos/
conten/d/UNSGtoUNGAmarch04.pdf; G.A. Res. 58/240, supra note 57 at para. 28.
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The International Community Created the 2005 Draft Protocol in an
Effort to Confront the Increasing Danger Posed by Maritime
Terrorism

The 2005 Draft Protocol amends the 1988 SUA Convention. The
Draft Protocol attempts to strengthen the international community’s ability
to prevent maritime terrorism. Catalyzed by the attacks against the United
States on September 11, 2001, the 2005 Draft Protocol emerged when the
world realized the growing threat that maritime terrorism posed to the safety
of navigation.
1.

The SUA Convention, Precursor to the 2005 Draft Protocol, Was
Written to Ensure that the Perpetrators of Maritime Terrorism Would
Be Brought to Justice

Adopted on March 10, 1988,61 the SUA Convention was created in
response to the fear that ships traveling on the high seas were tempting
targets for international terrorists. International Maritime Organization
(“IMO”) members were responsible for creating the SUA Convention. The
166-member IMO is a specialized U.N. agency that focuses on international
shipping.62
The October 198563 terrorist hijacking of the cruise ship Achille
Lauro, during which an elderly, disabled passenger was murdered, catalyzed
the SUA Convention’s development.64 In November 1986, Austria, Egypt,
and Italy issued a proposal asking the IMO to call an international
conference to draft a convention focused on stopping illegal actions against
maritime navigation.65 Accordingly, the convention’s purpose is “to ensure
that appropriate judicial action is taken against persons committing unlawful
acts against ships.”66 It was written to guarantee that, through prosecution

61

Summary of International Maritime Organization Conventions, available at http://www.uscg.mil/
international/affairs/Publications/MMSCode/english/AppendC.htm [hereinafter Summary of IMO
Conventions].
62
Wade Boese, Arms Control Association, Treaty Amended to Outlaw WMD at Sea, 35 ARMS
CONTROL TODAY 36, 36 (2005) available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-WMDsea.asp.
63
Christ Trelawney, Enhancing Port and Ship Security, in Proceedings of the Pakistan Trade and
Transport Facilitation 2003 Conference (Dec. 6, 2003) available at http://www.nttfc.org/proceed03/
proc03-trelawney.htm.
64
Recognising a Dangerous World, LLOYD’S LIST INT’L, Oct. 5, 2005.
65
Trelawney, supra note 63.
66
Frank Kennedy, Sea Views: Iacs Warns Over Inconsistent PSC Information, GULFNEWS.COM, Oct.
28, 2001, available at http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/01/10/28/30643.html.
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and extradition, there would be no shelter for individuals who commit illegal
acts contrary to “the safety of navigation.”67
Unlawful acts are defined to encompass a broad range of activities
including forceful seizure, violent acts against individuals on ships, and the
placing of destructive devices aboard a ship.68 The SUA Convention targets
actions that may negatively impact the navigation of vessels and requires the
domestic criminalization of such acts in the national laws of its parties as
well as their cooperation in the prosecution of violators.69
As of 2004, the SUA Convention had been ratified by 104 states that
together represented 81.52 percent of the world’s tonnage.70 In August
2005, the number of state parties had increased to 126.71
2.

The 2005 Draft Protocol Developed in Response to the Growing
Threat of International Maritime Terrorism

Negotiations for the development of the 2005 SUA Protocol arose in
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United
States. In Resolution A.924(22), issued November 2001, the IMO General
Assembly recognized the need to review the measures and procedures
intended to prevent maritime terrorism.72 IMO Secretary General William
O’Neal stated that “the shocking events of September 11th could not be
ignored by an international organisation, such as the IMO which has, as an
integral part of its mandate, the duty to make travel and transport by sea as
safe as possible.”73
The IMO Legal Committee sought to strengthen the SUA Convention
through amendments that would respond to the dangers posed by
international terrorism to maritime navigation.74 During the Eighty-fifth
Session of the IMO, the IMO Legal Committee conducted an exchange of
viewpoints on proposed amendments to the SUA Convention.75 The work of
67
International Conference Adopts Revised Treaties to Address Unlawful Acts at Sea, 28 OIL SPILL
INTELLIGENCE REPORT 1, 1 (Oct. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Oil Spill Intelligence Report].
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Kennedy, supra note 66.
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J. Ashley Roach, Enhancing Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, 59 J.
INT’L AFF. 97, 105 (2005).
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71
Roach, supra note 69 at 105.
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inven/pdfs/maritime.pdf.
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Navigation, 1988, Sept. 20, 2005 [hereinafter U.S. Consideration of a Draft Protocol].
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the IMO Legal Committee continued throughout the Eighty-sixth and
Eighty-seventh IMO sessions.76 During the Eighty-eighth Session of the
IMO, held in April 2004, most of the participating nations stated their
support for the development of the 2005 Protocol.77 However, several
delegations raised the possibility of a conflict with established ocean law
when they stressed the importance of ensuring that the SUA Protocol would
not threaten the right of innocent passage or the freedom of navigation.78
The United States strongly pushed for the development of the 2005
Draft Protocol. During the IMO Legal Committee’s meeting in April of
2005, the United States, as the lead delegation, proposed adding a number of
clauses that focused on broadening the range of potential offenses.79 The
efforts of the United States were successful; Article 3bis of the 2005 Draft
Protocol expands the offenses covered by the SUA Convention.80 They now
include violent attacks against vessels as well as ocean transport of explosive
and nuclear material given the intent that they be used in terrorist activity.81
The support of the United States continued in September 2005 when it
issued a Joint Comment with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions focused on the proposed 2005 Draft Protocol.82 The Joint Comment
tied the 2005 Draft Protocol to a growth in international treaty law, stating
that it would be “an additional tool to combat the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.”83 The Joint Comment also asserted that the 2005 Draft
Protocol conformed to international law, citing sources of specific interest to
the IMO.84 These included the IMO mandate as well as various IMO
assembly resolutions.85
Perhaps most importantly, the Joint Comment stated that the proposed
2005 Draft Protocol aligned with the decision made in the Eighty-ninth
session of the IMO “when developing new instruments or amendments to
existing ones, to ensure that these are compatible and not in conflict with
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other instruments of international law and that they cannot be interpreted or
used in a way that conflicts with such instruments.”86
The Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties met
October 10-14, 2005. 87 In accordance with IMO standard procedure, it was
open to both IMO member states and to members of the U.N. and its
specialized agencies.88 After more than three years of negotiations, the 2005
Draft Protocol was opened for signature on February 14, 2006.89 The United
States signed the Draft 2005 Protocol on February 17, 2006.90 It will enter
into force ninety days following the date of signature of the twelfth country
who “signs it without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval
(or deposits an instrument to that effect).”91
B.

The 2005 Draft Protocol Expands the Scope of the SUA Convention,
Increasing the Types of Forbidden Acts and Establishing a Set of
Nonflag-State Ship-Boarding Procedures

The 2005 Draft Protocol amends the SUA Convention. Therefore, all
state parties to the 2005 Draft Protocol must also, as a prerequisite, be
parties to the SUA Convention.92 According to the United States, it creates
one of the first international frameworks whose purpose is to “combat[] and
prosecute[] anyone who uses a ship . . . as a means to carry out a terrorist
attack, or who transports terrorists . . . by ship.”93 The two provisions of the
2005 Draft Protocol most pertinent to this comment are Article 3bis and
Article 8bis.
Article 3bis of the 2005 Draft Protocol, along with Articles 3ter and
3quater, expands the list of offenses covered by the Article 3 of the SUA
Convention, widening its prescriptive scope.94 Terrorist actions prohibited
by Article 3bis span a wide range of activities—from the use of a ship as a
weapon to the use of a ship as a mode of transport of terrorist material to the
targeting of a ship in a terrorist attack.95
86
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Although it increases the scope of possible offenses, Article 3bis also
includes important safeguards meant to protect innocent seafarers from
prosecution.96 The 2005 Draft Protocol does not allow the criminal
prosecution of seafarers who do not know about illegal conduct on their
vessels and who have not intentionally participated in such illegal conduct.97
Article 8bis of the 2005 Draft Protocol provides a mechanism through
which the international community may enforce Article 3bis. It outlines a
set of nonflag-state boarding procedures applicable to any vessel traveling
“seaward of any State’s territorial sea” given reasonable grounds to suspect
the vessel’s involvement in violations of Article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater.98
C.

Article 3bis, Article 3ter, and Article 3quater of the 2005 Draft
Protocol Expand the Activities Prohibited by Article 3 of the SUA
Convention

Articles 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater supplement Article 3 of the SUA
Convention. They create additional offenses that will be applicable to all
nations that sign the 2005 Draft Protocol.
Article 3bis may be split into three sections: Article 3bis(1)(a), Article
3bis(1)(b), and Article 3bis(2).99 Article 3bis(1)(a) prohibits four types of
activities when they are committed “to intimidate a population, or to compel
a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing
any act.”100 First, an individual may not “use[] against or on a ship or
discharge[] from a ship any explosive, radioactive material or BCN weapon
in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or
damage.”101 Article 1(1)(d) of the 2005 Draft Protocol defines BCN
weapons as biological weapons, chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, and
“other nuclear explosive devices.”102
Second, an individual may not discharge “oil, liquefied natural gas, or
other hazardous or noxious substance[s]” from a ship when the discharge is
“likely to cause death or serious injury or damage.”103 Third, an individual
may not “use[] a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or
damage.”104 Finally, an individual may not threaten, conditionally or non96
97
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100
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102
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104
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conditionally, to commit any of the three actions previously mentioned in
Article 3bis(1)(a).105 Both Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 3bis(1)(b) include
the requirement of intentionality; the offending individual must act
“unlawfully and intentionally.”106
While Article 3bis(1)(a) deals with a ship’s direct involvement, as an
aggressor or as a target, in maritime terrorism, Article 3bis(1)(b) focuses on
the transportation of materials that could be used in a terrorist attack. It
prohibits the shipping of BCN weapons, source material not covered under
the International Atomic Energy Agency’s comprehensive safeguards
agreement, other “explosive or radioactive material” to be used in a terrorist
attack or a threatened terrorist attack, and “any equipment, materials or
software or related technology” that is intended to contribute to “the design,
manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon.”107
Article 3bis(2) relates back to Article 3bis(1)(b). It creates safeguards,
defining situations when the 2005 Draft Protocol does not prohibit the
shipping of nuclear materials normally covered under Article 3bis(1)(b).108
Article 3ter prohibits the intentional maritime transport of any person
who has violated “[A]rticles 3, 3bis or 3quater or any offence set forth in
any treaty listed in the Annex” of the 2005 Draft Protocol.109 Liability under
Article 3ter rests upon the transporting parties’ knowledge of the
individual’s violation and their intent to help the violator “evade criminal
prosecution.”110
Article 3quater supplements Articles 3, 3bis, and 3ter. It makes it an
offense to “intentionally injure[] or kill[] any person” in conjunction with a
violation of “[A]rticle 3, paragraph 1, [A]rticle 3bis, or [A]rticle 3ter.”111 In
addition, it prohibits attempts to violate “[A]rticle 3, paragraph 1, [A]rticle
3bis, subparagraphs 1(a)(i), (ii) or (iii), or subparagraph (a)” of Article
3quater.112 Finally, it states that individuals may not participate, organize,
direct, or contribute to a violation of “[A]rticle 3, [A]rticle 3bis, [A]rticle
3ter or subparagraph (a) or (b) of” Article 3quater.113
This comment advocates for the incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a), in
conjunction with Article 8bis(5)(e), into UNCLOS Part VII. It argues for the
105
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creation of a nonflag-state right of visit given reasonable grounds to suspect
a ship’s involvement in an act of maritime terrorism, whether the ship is
attacking another ship or being used as a weapon. It does not propose
incorporation of Articles 3bis(1)(b), 3bis(2), 3ter, or 3quater into UNCLOS
Part VII because they would excessively widen the number of situations
during which a nonflag-state right of visit on the high seas would exist. As
discussed above, Articles 3bis(1)(b), 3bis(2), 3ter, and 3quater focus on
issues of transportation and other activities that, though related, are also
peripheral to maritime terrorism. In recognition of the international rights of
flag states, a nonflag-state right of visit on the high seas should only exist
given reasonable suspicion of a limited set of actions directly connected to
maritime terrorism and codified in Article 3bis(1)(a).
D.

Article 8bis(5)(d) and Article 8bis(5)(e) of the 2005 Draft Protocol
Establish Two Alternate Nonflag-State Ship-Boarding Procedures that
Enforce Article 3, Article 3bis, Article 3ter, and Article 3quater

Article 8bis outlines the procedure that a nonflag state must follow
when boarding a vessel “located seaward of any State’s territorial sea.”114 It
focuses on the boarding of vessels that have violated, are violating, or are
about to violate one of the offenses established by Article 3, Article 3bis,
Article 3ter, or Article 3quater.115 Thus, Article 8bis deals with offenses that
were committed in the past, that are being committed currently, and that may
be committed in the future.
This comment focuses on two of the different ship boarding
procedures outlined in Article 8bis—Article 8bis(5)(d) and Article
8bis(5)(e). It examines both provisions within the context of Article 8bis(6),
Article 8bis (7), and Article 8bis(8).
1.

Article 8bis(5)(d) and Article 8bis(5)(e) Do Not Require Flag-State
Approval on a Case-by-Case Basis

When a party to the 2005 Draft Protocol deposits its instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with the IMO, it has the
option of issuing different kinds of approval that grant permission for
nonflag-state boarding. This comment focuses on Article 8bis(5)(d) and
Article 8bis(5)(e), both of which allow nonflag states to board vessels given
a specific set of circumstances.116 Because flag-state approval under Article
114
115
116

Id., art. 8bis.
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8bis(5)(d) and Article 8bis(5)(e) is not needed on a case-by-case basis,
neither article requires the permission of the flag state to be given117 each
time a nonflag state conducts a high-seas boarding.
Under Article 8bis(5)(d), flag states may grant nonflag states
authorization to board and search their vessels if they have not responded to
the requesting state “within four hours of acknowledgement of receipt of a
request to confirm nationality.”
Alternatively, Article 8bis(5)(e) creates a much broader approval.
Voluntarily given by flag states, Article 8bis(5)(e) approval allows for
nonflag-state boarding anytime the requesting state has reasonable grounds
to suspect that a ship has violated, is violating, or is about to violate Article
3, Article 3bis, Article 3ter, or Article 3quater. Once a flag state has issued
the second type of approval, the party may choose to withdraw it at any
point.118 Upon boarding, the nonflag state may “search a ship, its cargo and
persons on board” and “question the persons on board in order to determine
if an offence under article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is
about to be committed.”119
This comment advocates for the incorporation of Article 8bis(5)(e)
into UNCLOS Part VII because it is broader than the Article 8bis(5)(d) ship
boarding procedure. Article 8bis(5)(d) gives requesting nonflag states the
right of visit only if they have requested permission to board and have not
received an answer from the flag state within four hours. Article 8bis(5)(e),
however, creates a nonflag-state right of visit anytime there is a reasonable
suspicion of a vessel’s participation in terrorist activity. Because the need to
prevent maritime terrorism is too great to be limited by predetermined wait
periods, the international community should incorporate Article 8bis(5)(e)
rather than Article 8bis(5)(d) into UNCLOS Part VII.
2.

Articles 8bis(6), 8bis(7), and 8bis(8) Provide the Context Within
Which Article 8bis(5)(e) Should Be Interpreted

Article 8bis(5)(e) provides a limited degree of power to nonflag states,
allowing only for the boarding and searching of a vessel and the questioning
of all individuals on board. In instances where the boarding state discovers
violations of Article 3, Article 3bis, Article 3ter, or Article 3quater, Article
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8bis(5)(e) does not address the jurisdictional issues involved in the resulting
arrests and prosecutions.
Article 8bis(6) fills the jurisdictional gap unaddressed by Article
8bis(5)(e). Once a requesting state has discovered evidence of violations of
Article 3, Article 3bis, Article 3ter, or Article 3quater, “the flag [s]tate may
authorize the requesting Party to detain the ship, cargo and persons on board
pending receipt of disposition instructions from the flag [s]tate.”120 A
boarding state that has received flag-state permission and has detained the
ship, cargo or person on board must inform the flag state “of the results of a
boarding, search and detention” as well as “of the discovery of evidence of
illegal conduct” unrelated to the SUA Convention.121
Article 8bis(8) preserves the right of a flag state “to exercise
jurisdiction over a detained ship, cargo or other items on board, including
seizure, forfeiture, arrest and prosecution.”122 Therefore, even if a nonflag
state is allowed to board and detain a vessel, the flag state retains jurisdiction
over arrest and prosecution. A flag state may choose to consent to the
exercise of jurisdiction by another state “having jurisdiction under article 6”
of the SUA Convention as long as such consent is allowable under “its
constitution and laws.”123
According to Article 8bis(7), flag states have the power to impose
conditions upon the actions of nonflag states as related to steps taken in
conformity with Article 8bis(5) or Article 8bis(6).124 Possible conditions
include requiring additional information from the requesting party and
“conditions relating to responsibility for and the extent of measure to be
taken.”125 Requesting states may bypass the flag state’s conditions under
only two circumstances: “when necessary to relieve imminent danger to the
lives of persons or where those measures derive from relevant bilateral or
multilateral agreements.”126 The flag state must still give permission for
arrests and prosecutions on a case-by-case basis.
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ARTICLE 3BIS(1)(A) AND ARTICLE 8BIS(5)(E) ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW

An attempt to codify an international rule against maritime terrorism,
Article 3bis(1)(a) is clearly in conformity with international law. Article
8bis(5)(e) also conforms with international law, including the legal
framework established by UNCLOS Articles 92 and 110.
A.

The Article 8bis(5)(e) Ship-Boarding Procedure Complies with
UNCLOS Article 92 and UNCLOS Article 110

Article 8bis(5)(e) conforms to the international legal framework
established by UNCLOS Articles 92 and 110. Both articles allow flag states
to enter into international treaties, granting a nonflag state the right to board
their vessels on the high seas. Article 8bis(5)(e) is clearly part of such an
international agreement. It follows, therefore, that it is in compliance with
UNCLOS.
B.

Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) Attempt to Preserve
International Peace and Security and Conform with International Law

Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) should be interpreted within
the context of the 2005 Draft Protocol. According to Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context.”127
The preamble to the 2005 Draft Protocol includes a number of
references that both individually and taken as a whole suggest the
Diplomatic Conference’s desire to conform to established international law.
To begin with, it acknowledges “that terrorist acts threaten international
peace and security.”128 In addition, it specifically recalls United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1373 (“Resolution 1373”).129 Adopted on
September 28, 2001, Resolution 1373 begins by stating that “any act of
international terrorism, constitute[s] a threat to international peace and
security.”130
The continued references to threats to “international peace and
security” are noteworthy in two respects. First, UNCLOS Article 88
127
128
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130
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explicitly reserves the high seas “for peaceful purposes.”131 Activities that
threaten international peace and security are clearly in violation of the
requirement that the high seas be used only for peaceful purposes. Second,
Article One of the Charter of the United Nations states that one of the
purposes of the United Nations is “[t]o maintain international peace and
security.”132 It is inferable from the references to international peace and
security in the preamble of the 2005 Protocol that the purpose behind Article
8bis is consistent with UNCLOS and with the Charter of the United Nations.
Resolution 1373 provides additional support for the international
legitimacy of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e). Paragraph 3(c) of
Resolution 1373 calls for international cooperation “particularly through
bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and
suppress terrorist attacks and [to] take action against perpetrators of such
acts.”133 While Article 3bis(1)(a) outlines the maritime terrorist activity
forbidden by the 2005 Draft Protocol, Article 8bis(5)(e) enforces the rules
prescribed by Article 3bis(1)(a). Assuming that Article 3bis(1)(a) and
Article 8bis(5)(e) are consistent with international law, it follows that they
are the type of cooperative action sanctioned by Resolution 1373.
V.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD INCORPORATE ARTICLE
3BIS(1)(A) AND ARTICLE 8BIS(5)(E) INTO UNCLOS PART VII,
ALLOWING FOR A NONFLAG-STATE RIGHT OF VISIT ON THE HIGH SEAS
GIVEN REASONABLE GROUNDS TO SUSPECT A VESSEL IS INVOLVED IN
TERRORIST ACTIVITY

The international community should amend UNCLOS Part VII,
incorporating Article 3bis(1)(a) as a prescriptive rule and Article 8bis(5)(e)
as the mechanism through which to enforce that rule. This would create an
additional exception to the general principle of flag-state control on the high
seas. Maritime terrorism has become an increasingly dangerous threat. To
ensure adequate protection against such violence, a state must be allowed to
board a vessel on the high seas, even if the vessel is flying a flag other than
its own, given reasonable grounds to suspect the ship’s participation in
maritime terrorism.
Protection against maritime terrorism is too important a task to be
subject to existing inconsistencies in enforcement. Unfortunately, flag states
exert varying levels of regulation and control over their ships on the high
131
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seas. To combat the resulting weakness in maritime security, the
international community should ensure that it has a uniform ability to board
ships suspected of involvement in maritime terrorism.
The ability of nonflag states to board vessels on the high seas
suspected of participation in terrorism would help to protect against
maritime terrorism in two ways. It would increase the ability of the
international community to respond to potential threats, and it would offer
further deterrence against potential maritime terrorists. The best way to
accomplish this goal is to incorporate Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article
8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII.
The incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into Part
VII of UNCLOS would apply only to ships sailing on the high seas. Part
VII of UNCLOS focuses exclusively on the high seas; vessels traveling in
other portions of the ocean would be unaffected. While many of the
potential targets of maritime terrorism are not located on the high seas,
increased international scrutiny on the high seas remains an important tool in
the prevention of such attacks. The world needs to stop maritime terrorists
before they enter into the territorial waters and the ports of coastal states.
The 2005 Draft Protocol is a step in the right direction. Its approach
to improving maritime security, however, is too timid. In the 2005 Draft
Protocol, the Article 8bis(5)(e) ship-boarding provision is optional, one of
several procedures from which flag states may choose. In addition, there is
no guarantee that the 2005 Draft Protocol will impact enough nations to be
truly effective.
The United Nations “has adopted a pro-active approach” in its
struggle against terrorism.134 The international community should extend
this same approach to the challenge posed by maritime terrorism and
incorporate Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII.
This would result in a specific definition of maritime terrorism and in an
appropriate response, one that is necessary to prevent terrorist attacks.
A.

The International Community Should Incorporate Article 3bis(1)(a)
and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII Through the Amendment
Procedures of UNCLOS Article 312 or UNCLOS Article 313

The international community should incorporate Article 3bis(1)(a) and
Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII pursuant to UNCLOS Article 312
or UNCLOS Article 313. At its creation, UNCLOS was intended to be
134
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“comprehensive in scope and universal in participation.”135 To ensure that
the convention would remain “capable of further evolution,” the
international community included articles allowing for amendment and
incorporation of international agreements and standards.136 The nations
involved in the development of UNCLOS stressed that the amendment
procedures represented a balance between the “overriding principle of [the]
preservation” of UNCLOS as a “package deal” and a “right of amendment”
implied by a nation’s acceptance of the convention.137 UNCLOS may be
amended through Article 312 or through a simplified procedure codified in
Article 313.
UNCLOS Article 312 allows party states to propose amendments
“[a]fter the expiry of a period of 10 years from the date” that UNCLOS
entered into force.138 The ten-year waiting period may have been an attempt
to “prevent immediate challenges to the package deal regime” of the
convention.139 To propose an amendment, a state party must first give the
secretary general of the United Nations a written copy of the proposed
amendment and request that he convene a “conference to consider such
proposed amendment[].”140 The proposed amendment is then circulated
among all state parties.141 The secretary general convenes a conference to
consider the proposed amendment if, within a year, “not less than one half of
the State Parties reply favorably to the request.”142
A conference to consider a proposed amendment to UNCLOS, will,
unless participants decide otherwise, apply the same “decision-making
procedure” as was utilized at the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea.143 In addition, conference participants must “make every
effort to reach agreement on any amendments by way of consensus.”144 The
creation of consensus is important, as UNCLOS Article 316 requires the
proposed amendment’s ratification or accession “by two thirds of the State

135
Alan Boyle, Further Development of the Law of the Sea Convention: Mechanisms for Change, 54
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 563, 563 (2005).
136
Id., at 563-64.
137
David Freestone & Alex G. Oude Elferink, Flexibility and Innovation in the Law of the Sea – Will
the LOS Convention Amendment Procedures Ever Be Used?, in STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA: THE ROLE OF THE LOS CONVENTION 174 (Alex G. Oude Elferink ed., 2005).
138
UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 312(1).
139
Freestone and Elferink, supra note 137, at 176.
140
UNCLOS, supra note 37, art. 312(1).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id., art. 312(2).
144
Id.

JANUARY 2007 2005 SUA PROTOCOL, ARTICLES 3BIS(1)(A) AND 8BIS(5)(E)

131

Parties or by 60 State Parties, whichever is greater,” before it can enter into
force.145
A state party may also propose an amendment through the simplified
procedures of UNCLOS Article 313. Pursuant to UNCLOS Article 313, the
secretary general will circulate the party’s proposed amendment to all state
parties.146 If, within a year of its initial circulation, no state party objects to
the proposed amendment, it “shall be considered [to be] adopted.”147 The
simplicity of UNCLOS Article 313 may “have been intended to allow
amendments necessary to keep the convention up to date to be made at any
point.”148
Proposed amendments, emerging according to both Article 312 and
Article 313, are “open for signature by State Parties for 12 months from the
date of adoption.”149 Pursuant to UNCLOS Article 316(1), they enter into
force “on the thirtieth day following the deposit of instruments of ratification
or accession by two thirds of the State Parties or by 60 State Parties,
whichever is greater.”150 After an amendment has entered into force, any
state that then becomes a party to UNCLOS will, unless is has expressed
otherwise, also be a member to the amendment.151
As of spring 2006, no state had attempted to amend UNCLOS using
the procedures set forth within UNCLOS Article 312 or UNCLOS Article
313.152 This may be because of the high bar set by UNCLOS Article 316,
specifically its requirement of ratification or accession “by two thirds of the
State Parties or by 60 State Parties, whichever is greater” before an
amendment may enter into force. The amendment proposed by this
comment, incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into
UNCLOS Part VII, would be the first attempt to amend UNCLOS pursuant
to UNCLOS Article 312 or UNCLOS Article 313.
Worldwide consensus is needed in the fight against maritime
terrorism. The success of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) depends
upon the number of countries that embrace them. David H. Anderson, a
former judge at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, argues that
international usage of the UNCLOS amendment procedures is “a question of
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politics and diplomacy.”153
The UNCLOS Article 316 amendment
requirements would encourage the international community to employ the
power of politics and diplomacy to increase the ratification and accession of
Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e).
The incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into
UNCLOS Part VII, as the convention’s first proposed amendment, would
also be symbolic of the international community’s commitment to stop
maritime terrorism. When it created UNCLOS Articles 312 and 313, the
international community stressed that UNCLOS should be able to adapt to
“technological advances” and “economic, political and juridical” changes.154
The increasing need to respond to the threat posed by maritime terrorism is
the type of adaptation envisioned by the UNCLOS creators.
B.

Incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into
UNCLOS Part VII Would Ensure Conformity with International Law,
Uniformity, and Wide-Scale Observance

Incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into
UNCLOS Part VII would solve three problems inherent in the 2005 Draft
Protocol’s maritime terrorism ship-boarding provisions. First, it would
create a general nonflag-state right of visit given reasonable suspicion of a
vessel’s participation in maritime terrorist activity. Second, it would
decrease the potential for overlaps and possible inconsistencies inherent in a
system that now relies on multiple bilateral and multilateral treaties. Finally,
it would separate the issue of maritime terrorism, as defined by Article
3bis(1)(a), from more contentious portions of the 2005 Draft Protocol. This
would increase the probability international consensus supporting a nonflagstate right of visit on the high seas given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s
involvement in maritime terrorism.
1.

Incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into
UNCLOS Part VII Would Create a Nonflag-State Right of Visit Given
Reasonable Suspicion of a Vessel’s Involvement in Maritime Terrorism

The inclusion of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) in UNCLOS
Part VII would create a right of visit given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s
involvement in maritime terrorist activity. This would dramatically improve
the legal procedure codified in the 2005 Draft Protocol. The 2005 Draft
153
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Protocol does not require state parties to grant nonflag states a right of visit
given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s involvement in maritime terrorism.
Rather, it explicitly allows flag states to refuse to grant such permission. In
addition, it permits flag states that choose to grant nonflag states permission
to board one of their vessels to do so in one of two ways—on a general basis
or on an ad-hoc basis.
As written, the 2005 Draft Protocol allows a state party to choose to
grant a nonflag-state right of visit only if the nonflag state has requested
permission and has failed to receive a response “within four hours of
acknowledgement of receipt of [its] request.”155 Under this option, not only
must the nonflag state wait for four hours before exercising the right of visit,
but the flag state retains the right to deny its request. Both of these
requirements are impediments to international security in the case of a vessel
reasonably suspected of participation in terrorist activities. Given suspicion
of a vessel’s involvement in maritime terrorism, a nonflag state should have
the right of visit immediately, just as it would in cases of piracy, slavery, or
illegal broadcasting.
2.

Incorporating Articles 3bis(1)(a) and 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part
VII Would Create a Uniform Legal Rule Focused on Maritime
Terrorism

To be successful, the world’s counterterrorism strategy must have an
intelligible prescriptive foundation and utilize one coherent high-seas shipboarding procedure to be followed when a vessel on the high seas is
suspected of participating in maritime terrorist activity. Boarding states
must be able to rely on a uniform protocol, a protocol whose existence
would also serve as a deterrent against maritime terrorism.
There is no uniform antiterrorism ship-boarding procedure under the
current legal framework. Instead, a series of bilateral and multilateral
treaties attempt to work within the structure established by UNCLO Articles
92 and 110. The 2005 Draft Protocol symbolizes a larger movement to
broaden the scope of allowable nonflag-state ship boarding on the high seas
in order to confront evolving maritime security threats.
For example, the Proliferation Security Initiative (“PSI”) is an
international effort “to enhance and expand . . . efforts to prevent the flow of
WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials on the ground, in the air,
and at sea, to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation
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concern.”156 By June 2005, more than sixty nations were in support of the
PSI.157 Like the SUA Convention and the 2005 Draft Protocol, participation
in the PSI is voluntary.158 Although it has spawned the creation of six
bilateral ship-boarding agreements,159 the PSI provides no legal authority
supporting high-seas interdictions that have not been authorized by the flag
state.160
Amending UNCLOS Part VII to incorporate Article 3bis(1)(a) and
Article 8bis(5)(e) would create a uniform nonflag-state right of visit given
reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s participation in maritime terrorism. As
this comment previously discussed, pursuant to UNCLOS Article 316, an
amendment requires the ratification of two-thirds of UNCLOS states parties.
Therefore, if the international community were to incorporate Article
3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII through
amendment, it would effectively be crafting an international consensus,
creating a uniform procedure to be followed in instances of suspected
participation in maritime terrorism.
3.

Incorporation into UNCLOS Part VII Would Increase the Influence of
Articles 3bis(1)(a) and 8bis(5)(e)

Incorporation into UNCLOS Part VII would increase the influence of
Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) by creating a uniform nonflag-state
right of visit on the high seas given a reasonable suspicion that a ship is
involved in terrorist activity. It would also broaden the number of states that
are likely to embrace Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e).
Despite the urgency of the situation, the scope of the 2005 Draft
Protocol is extremely narrow. It does not add an additional UNCLOS
Article 110 right of visit for situations in which a vessel is suspected of
participation in maritime terrorism. Instead, it simply creates “a voluntary
expedited interdiction procedure.”161 Amending UNCLOS to incorporate
Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII would
prevent states that are party to the amendment from refusing to allow a
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nonflag state a right of visit given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s
involvement in maritime terrorism.
In addition, the 2005 Draft Protocol, when it enters into force, will
have the power to bind only those states that have agreed to become party to
it.162 There is a risk that “states not party to treaties like the 1968 Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)” will refuse to sign the
2005 Draft Protocol.163 Pakistan, India, and Israel have all “made clear their
opposition to aspects of the Protocol . . . which in effect give[] recognized
nuclear-weapon states a privileged status vis-à-vis other states.”164
The incorporation of Article 3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into
UNCLOS Part VII would divorce the issue of a nonflag-state right of visit
on the high seas given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s involvement in
maritime terrorism from the more controversial sections of the 2005 Draft
Protocol.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The rising threat of maritime terrorism is a danger that the world
cannot ignore. The secretary general of the International Maritime
Organization, Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, recognized the danger that
terrorism poses to maritime security at the close of the October conference
adopting the 2005 Protocol.165 He stated that with regard to the 2005 Draft
Protocol, “[t]he usual request for States to become Parties” is transformed
into “an urgent plea.”166 He warned that the international community is
“running a race against time” as it attempts to ensure maritime safety.167
Though the 2005 Draft Protocol was created to address the challenges
of maritime terrorism, it is too timid in its approach to nonflag-state ship
boarding on the high seas given reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s
participating in maritime terrorism. It attempts to increase maritime security
while remaining within the current UNCLOS framework. The international
community must be willing to amend UNCLOS, incorporating Article
3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII.
To confront the danger posed by maritime terrorism, the world should
provide nonflag states a high-seas right to visit given reasonable grounds to
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suspect that a vessel has engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in
maritime terrorism as defined by Article 3bis(1)(a). The current reliance on
flag-state enforcement has created weaknesses in the world’s maritime
security regime. Flag states, particularly flags of convenience, have little
incentive to ensure compliance with international norms. The international
community must ensure maritime security by filling the gaps that have
opened as a result of poor flag-state enforcement.
If a nonflag state has reasonable grounds to suspect a vessel’s
participation in terrorist activity, it must have the power to board it before it
reaches its intended target. If the world fails to take this step, a nation may
be faced with two dangerous options—to let a ship go, risking possible
violence, or to violate international law. No nation should be forced to make
this choice, a quandary that may be prevented by the incorporation of Article
3bis(1)(a) and Article 8bis(5)(e) into UNCLOS Part VII.

